Relationship Between Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure, Corporate Governance, And Tax Avoidance by Natalia, Maria et al.
Relationship Between Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure, Corporate Governance, And Tax Avoidance 
Maria Natalia, Verani Carolina, & Joni 
 
79 
 
 
Relationship Between Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure, 
Corporate Governance, And Tax Avoidance 
 
Maria Natalia1, Verani Carolina2 and Joni3  
1,2,3 Maranatha Christian University, Bandung, Indonesia 
maria.natalia@eco.maranatha.edu 
 
 
Abstract 
This study aims to examine the effect of corporatesocial responsibility disclosure 
on tax avoidance with corporate governance as moderation variable. The 
disclosure of corporate social responsibility in this study is measured using 
performance indicators from Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 4.1. The score of 
corporate governance is measured using ASEAN CG Scorecard, while tax 
avoidance is measured by Cash ETR. The sample in this study is a manufacturing 
company listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2018. This study refers to 
Lanis and Richardson (2012) which found that, the higher the disclosure of social 
responsibility, the lower the tax avoidance. This study also refers to Salhi et al. 
(2019) which found that, if corporate governance has been performed well, 
companies are less likely to do tax avoidance. The results of the study showed that 
corporate social responsibility and corporate governance had no effect on tax 
avoidance. Likewise, corporate governance cannot moderate the effect of 
corporate social responsibility on tax avoidance 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate social responsibility is a form of corporate responsibility to all 
stakeholders, while tax is a form of corporate social responsibility to stakeholders 
through the government. Thus, companies involved in tax avoidance are socially 
irresponsible companies (Lanis and Richardson, 2012). By avoiding taxes, 
companies can increase profitability and cash flow, but the tax reduction can affect 
support for the government in development and other social programs (Supriyadi, 
2016). 
Research of Hoi, et al. (2013) found that companies with irresponsible 
corporate social responsibility disclosures tend to practice tax avoidance 
aggressively. Meanwhile, according to Dharma and Noviari (2017), companies with 
responsible corporate social responsibility activities have a lower chance of getting 
involved in tax avoidance practices. 
One of the important principles in implementing good corporate governance is 
the principle of transparency. If the company applies this principle, the company will 
provide information not only as required by the provisions, but also other relevant 
information required by shareholders and stakeholders. With transparency and 
openness, external parties can access important company information, including 
tax information (Wahyudi, 2014). 
Research of Minnick (2010) found that corporate governance affects tax 
avoidance. Corporate governance plays an important role in controlling the 
consequences of agency problems in tax avoidance practices, where this practice 
opens opportunities for managers to be opportunistic for short-term profit goals 
which are likely to harm shareholders in the long term.  
Based on the description above, the researchers are interested in conducting 
research on the effect of corporate social responsibility disclosure on tax 
avoidance, with corporate governance as moderation variable. This study refers to 
the research of Lanis and Richardson (2012) which found that the higher the 
disclosure of social responsibility, the lower the tax avoidance. This study also 
refers to the research of Salhi et al. (2019) who found that if corporate governance 
has been performed well, companies are less likely to do tax avoidance. 
The difference between this study and previous studies is the use of corporate 
governance variable as moderating variable. The corporate governance score is 
measured using the ASEAN CG Scorecard. The implementation of the Asean CG 
Scorecard in Indonesia is still quite few, so that the Otoristas Jasa Keuangan (OJK) 
encourages the implementation of good corporate governance. The next difference 
is the sample. In this study, the samples used were manufacturing companies listed 
on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) during 2018. Manufacturing companies 
were used as samples, because there was a decrease in tax revenue in January 
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2019. From this, it can be seen that manufacturing companies are indicated to have 
committed tax evasion which could harm state revenue. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Legitimacy Theory 
The difference between company values and social values is often called the 
"legitimacy gap" which can affect the company's capabilities to continue its 
business activities. The company must identify the activities under its control and 
reassure the public related to company operating activities. This is done so that the 
company get legitimacy from the public which in the end will reduce the legitimacy 
gap.  
According to Tarigan (2014), reporting of sustainability reports conducted by 
companies can reduce the legitimacy gap. In addition, disclosure of Corporate 
Social Responsibility can be a medium of communication between the company 
and the public, which is expected to improve the company's legitimacy, increase 
company profits in the future and ensure the company's going concern (Lindawati & 
Puspita, 2015). 
2.2. Stakeholder Theory 
Freeman and McVea (2001) defined stakeholder as any group or individual 
who able to influence or be influenced by the achievement of organizational goals. 
Stakeholder theory strengthens the concept that companies are responsible not 
only to shareholders but also to stakeholders (Maulida & Adam, 2012). According 
to Freeman (1984), the stakeholder theory identifies the generation of value as a 
central driver of every corporate, but it recognises that this value is to be shared by 
a group of stakeholders that includes not only shareholders and managers but all 
society that may have an interest in the firm operates. The theory is structured 
under two key questions: What is the firm's purpose? And what is management's 
responsibility to stakeholders? These questions direct executives to think about 
how kind of relationships they want and need to create with stakeholders in order to 
achieve their goals (Freeman, 2000). 
The stakeholder theory is “managerial” in the sense that it addresses how 
managers perform their duties, and it is intimately connected to the practice of 
business, of value creation and trade (Laplume, Sonpar, & Litz, 2008). Moreover, it 
explicitly recognizes that shareholders are important stakeholders; however, they 
are just one of myriad incumbents. Similarly, it recognizes that profits are a 
important dimension of the day-to-day activity of the firm, but profits and financial 
performance are one possible outcome of the process of value creation. 
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According to Donaldson and Preston (1995), the theory can be examined from 
three different perspectives, namely, the descriptive, the instrumental and the 
normative perspectives. The descriptive perspective assumes an empirically 
oriented use of the theory to show how concepts correspond to reality. 
Theodoulidis et al. (2017) instrumental perspective relates to the use of the theory 
to show the connection between stakeholder management and multidimensional 
corporate performance. Third, the normative perspective is used to examine how 
stakeholders behave and the motivations underlying their actions. 
Stakeholder Theory and then grew into organization theory (e.g. Donaldson & 
Preston, 1995), business ethics (e.g. Phillips & Reichart, 2000), social issues in 
management (e.g. Wood, 1991) and sustainable development (e.g. Sharma & 
Henriques, 2005). Over the last few years, there has been a rise in its prominence, 
in a recent review by Laplume et al. (2008), the literature on stakeholder theory 
addressed five themes across multiple research fields, namely, stakeholder 
definition and salience, stakeholder actions and responses, firm actions and 
responses, firm performance and theory debates. 
2.3. Signaling Theory 
Aryati and Wibowo (2017) stated that signal theory discusses how companies 
should provide signals to users of financial statements, where these signals can be 
an information about the condition of the company to owners or other interested 
parties. Signal theory encourages firms to provide information to external parties. 
This is due to the occurrence of information asymmetry between management and 
external parties. In reducing information asymmetry, companies must disclose the 
information they have. Information that must be disclosed by companies is 
information about Corporate Social Responsibility. The company exercises the 
disclosure of Corporate Social Responsibility with the hope of being able to improve 
reputation and corporate value (Rustiarini, 2010). 
2.4. Corporate Social Responsibility 
Ocran (2011) stated that Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is a concept 
that requires practice in which corporate entities voluntarily integrate the good that 
received by companies both social and environmental in their business philosophy 
and operations. In Indonesia, the company's obligation to perform social 
responsibility is regulated in Article 1 Number 3 of Undang-Undang Nomor 40 
Tahun 2007 related to Perseroan Terbatas (hereinafter referred to as the UU PT) 
by using the term Tanggung Jawab Sosial dan Lingkungan (TJSL) as a translation 
of the term Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) to the context of the company in 
Indonesian society and defines it as company's commitment to participate in 
sustainable economic development in order to improve the quality of life and the 
useful environment, both for the company itself, the local community, and public in 
general. 
2.5. Stakeholder Theory and CSR 
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CSR is seen as “a process to integrate social, environmental, ethical, human 
rights and consumer concerns into their business operations with the aim of 
maximizing the creation of shared value for their owners/shareholders and for their 
other stakeholders and society at large” (European Commission, 2011). This 
conceptualization of CSR fits nicely with the stakeholder theory approach that 
views CSR as an extension of corporate governance, whereby a firm's duties 
extend beyond its shareholders to a broader group of stakeholders (Donaldson & 
Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Rowley & Berman, 2000). 
Previous empirical research viewed CSR activities under a single aggregated 
measure, there is a strong view that the different dimensions of CSR affect the firm 
in different ways and, thus, should be examined separately (Inoue & Lee, 2011). 
and then, it has been argued that the multidimensionality of CSR can be better 
assessed through a stakeholder framework that evaluates firms manage their 
relationships with their stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995; Rowley & Berman, 2000). 
The stakeholder theory can be used with three different perspectives to study 
how stakeholder interests affect the characteristics of the firm and its multi-
dimensional performance, among them namely descriptive (how the stakeholder 
theory concepts correspond to reality), instrumental (what are the configurations of 
managers' decisions regarding stakeholder interest in CSR activities and the 
outcomes?) and normative (how managers should deal with stakeholders’ concerns 
regarding CSR activities and their motivations for it) (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). 
The conceptualization of these perspectives requires the development of research 
models that are relevant. 
2.6. Corporate Governance 
Forum Corporate Governance on Indonesia (FCGI) defines corporate 
governance as a set of rules which manage the relationship between shareholders, 
managers, creditors, government, employees and other internal and external 
stakeholders that related to their rights and obligations. According to the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2004), corporate 
governance is a system in which a company or business entity is directed and 
supervised. Based on the description above, it can be concluded that the essence 
of corporate governance is a system and a set of regulations that manage the 
relationship of various stakeholders or in a narrow sense the relationship between 
shareholders, the board of commissioners and directors for the achievement of 
company’s goal. 
2.7. Tax Avoidance 
Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) stated that tax avoidance can be interpreted as 
effective tax planning, namely reducing the tax expense through a scheme that has 
been regulated in taxation legislation and its nature does not cause disputes 
between taxpayers and tax authorities because it takes advantage of weaknesses 
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in the taxation provisions of a country. Form of tax avoidance that is done legally is 
called tax management. 
2.8. The Relation of CSR and Tax Avoidance 
The paradox of promising social responsibility and ethical behaviour, on the 
one hand, and the dedication to tax avoidance and evasion, on the other hand, is 
criticised in the Sikka (2010) paper. According to the same source too, the 
problems usually originate from the lack of disclosure of information on tax issues 
in the financial reporting. Meanwhile according from Russel and Brock (2016) the 
explained that the topic of tax avoidance is sensitive and causes the feelings of 
anger and injustice, amongst other reasons because the expertise and availability 
of tax management options are available only to wealthy individuals and 
multinational companies. The paper from Preuss (2012) attempts to measures the 
relationship between CSR and tax avoidance. Nonetheless, the critical aspects of 
tax avoidance are acknowledged, as it seems clear that tax revenue is of 
enormous importance and an essential part of the functioning for the government 
and society. Therefore, Bird and Davis-Nozemack (2016) regard tax avoidance as 
a sustainability problem.  
Bird and Davis-Nozemack (2016) said that the consequences of tax avoidance 
affect the environmental, social and economic aspects of the society, and thus 
demand a shift in values towards long-term responsibility. Fisher (2014) said that 
the adverse effects of tax avoidance affect not just the outside stakeholders but 
also the company itself because of potential misallocation of funds, reputational 
risks and the effects on the corporate culture. To support the Fisher’s argument, 
Bird and Davis-Nozemack (2016) say that the firms have an obligation to conform 
to ethical and social demands from the society. This statement was based on a 
CSR point of view.  
Some studies such as the paper by Muller and Kolk (2015) finds that firms with 
stronger CSR characteristics pay higher taxes. Similarly, Laguir et al. (2015) find 
that CSR and tax rate are positively related, and the relationship is mainly driven 
by social and economic factors of CSR. This intuitive argumentation follows the 
resource-based view, i.e., that firms use CSR to signal their performance. 
Most empirical studies on the relationship of CSR and tax avoidance analyse it 
on a firm-level basis. The Jackson and Apostolakou’s paper (2010) finds that CSR 
may take a substituting role for weaker institutions in liberal market economies. 
This approach is adopted to this analysis to gain some insight why there is a 
difference between the tax avoidance behaviour of firms from different countries. 
The literature widely affirms that increased CSR is associated with lower 
effective tax rates. This supports the claims of Sikka (2010, 2013) accusing firms of 
acting “hypocrite”. The research on tax avoidance and corporate governance finds 
evidence for an impact on value creation. Little is known how CSR affects the 
relationship between value creation and tax avoidance. It follows that an analysis 
of the value impact is worth further investigation in the context of CSR. 
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2.9. Hypothesis Development 
The relationship between corporate social responsibility disclosure and tax 
avoidance is based on theoretical legitimacy. According to Hidayati and Murni 
(2009), the concept of legitimacy shows company's responsibility to the public to be 
able to maintain its going concern. The higher the level of CSR disclosure of a 
company, the higher the company's reputation to the public. Watson (2011) in their 
research proved that companies that have higher CSR disclosure tend to be less 
aggressive in their tax avoidance practices compared to companies that have 
lower CSR disclosure. Lanis and Richardson (2012) research found that the higher 
the level of corporate social responsibility, the lower level of tax avoidance. Based 
on the description above, the first hypothesis in this study is as follows: 
 
H1: Corporate social responsibility disclosure has a negative effect on tax 
avoidance  
 
Salhi et al. (2019) found that if corporate governance has been performed well, 
companies tend are less likely to do tax avoidance. This is in line with research 
conducted by Minick (2010) who found that corporate governance mechanisms 
affect tax avoidance. In fact, the effect of increasing tax rates on government tax 
revenue will vary depending on the strength of corporate governance (Lee et al, 
2015). Recent research conducted by Bayar et al. (2018) showed that stronger 
governance mechanisms can help companies reduce the negative consequences 
of tax avoidance. Based on the description above, the second hypothesis in this 
study is as follows: 
 
H2: Corporate governance has a negative effect on tax avoidance. 
 
Corporate social responsibility is one of the implementations of GCG which 
must be applied ethically for the sustainability of the company. If corporate 
governance has been properly performed, companies tend to not do tax avoidance 
(Salhi, 2019). Therefore, corporate governance can strengthen the negative effect 
of disclosure of corporate social responsibility on tax avoidance. 
 
H3: Corporate Governance can moderate negative effect of corporate social 
responsibility disclosure on tax avoidance. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
The companies sampled in this study are manufacturing companies in 
Indonesia that have been listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in 2018. 
The dependent variable in this study is tax avoidance measured by the formula: 
 
The independent variable in this study is the score of corporate social responsibility 
disclosure measured using the performance indicators of the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) 4.1. 
                        CSRD = ∑X 
                                        N 
The moderation variable in this study is score of corporate governance measured 
by Asean CG Scorecard. The control variable in this study is size of the company, 
growth, ROA, and leverage. Hypothesis testing in this study will use direct 
equations through simple linear regression analysis and multiple linear regression 
analysis. 
 
4. RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
4.1. Results of Sample Selection 
The population of this study were all manufacturing companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2018. The sample in this study was selected 
using the purposive sampling method. The list of companies sampled in this study 
can be seen in Appendix 1. Table 1. below shows a summary of the sample 
selection process used in the study. 
 
Table 1. Selection of Research Sample 
 
 
Sample Criteria Total 
Total of manufacturing companies listed on the IDX for the 2018 period 177 
Manufacturing companies that publish annual reports for the 2018 period and can 
be accessed through www.idx.co.id. 
(39) 
The company's annual report discloses corporate governance and corporate 
social responsibility activities 
(28) 
Companies that issue financial statements in currencies other than Rupiah (10) 
Companies that do not have an accumulated tax loss (20) 
Companies with outlier data  (6) 
Total samples  74 
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4.2. Analysis of Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
  N MAX MIN MEAN STD DEV 
CSRD 74 0,8352 0,0000 0,4018 0,2112 
CG 74 92,7266 26,0329 68,1449 11,9292 
CETR 74 1,3643 0,0008 0,3045 0,2183 
SIZE 74 19,6582 11,9157 14,8176 16,6798 
GROWTH 74 0,5854 -0,1476 0,1338 0,1301 
ROA 74 0,9210 0,0079 0,0952 0,1270 
LEV 74 3,6093 0,0994 0,8430 0,7208 
 
Based on Table 2, the average value of the CSRD variable is 0.4018. This 
means that the average value of the corporate social responsibility disclosure used 
as sample in this study is relatively low. In other words, manufacturing companies 
in Indonesia have not fully disclosed their corporate social responsibility in their 
annual reports. Meanwhile, the corporate governance variable has a standard 
deviation value of 11.9292, with a mean or average of 68.1449. The standard 
deviation is smaller than the mean, meaning that the corporate governance score 
in the sample companies is quite even or not very different. The tax avoidance 
variable has a minimum value of 0.0008 and a maximum value of 1.3643, which 
means that the smaller amount of the tax avoidance means that the company is 
not doing tax avoidance. From the results of these descriptive statistics, it is known 
that the average value of tax avoidance in the sample studied is 0.3045 with a 
standard deviation of 0.2183. 
4.3. Hypothesis Testing Results 
Based on the results of the regression analysis in table 3., it can be concluded 
that both corporate social responsibility and corporate governance have no effect 
on tax avoidance. Likewise, corporate governance cannot moderate the effect of 
corporate social responsibility on tax avoidance. 
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Table 3. A Dependent Variable: CETR 
Model 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardize
d 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 0.685 0.356  1.924 0.059 
CSR -0.203 0.722 -0.196 -0.281 0.780 
CG -0.003 0.004 -0.185 -0.876 0.384 
SIZE -0.015 0.019 -0.118 -0.795 0.430 
GRW -0.137 0.200 -0.082 -0.688 0.494 
ROA 0.671 0.193 0.391 3.474 0.001 
LEV 0.032 0.035 0.105 0.900 0.371 
MOD 0.003 0.009 0.254 0.318 0.751 
 
In testing the first hypothesis, it was found that corporate social responsibility 
had no effect on tax avoidance. This is in line with research by Preuss (2010) and 
Sikka (2010) showed companies that perform corporate social responsibility 
continue to avoid taxes. The higher the disclosure of corporate social responsibility, 
the higher the tax avoidance will be. In the Indonesian context, this occur closely 
related to tax incentives on corporate social responsibility in accordance with 
Undang-Undang No. 36 tahun 2008 concerning Perubahan Keempat Undang-
Undang Nomor 7 Tahun 1983 tentang Pajak Penghasilan dan Peraturan 
Pemerintah Nomor 93 tahun 2010, due to tax incentives for CSR expenditures in 
the form of tax deduction (is allowed companies expenditures related to CSR to 
calculate Taxable Income), so that the Income Tax Payable is smaller. With this tax 
reduction, tax incentives are expected to affect the relationship between corporate 
social responsibility and tax aggressiveness. 
The result of testing the second hypothesis showed that corporate governance 
had no significant effect on tax avoidance in manufacturing companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange in the 2018 period, where the significance value of 
0.384 is greater than the significance level of 0.05. Thus, H1 is rejected. Good 
corporate governance mechanisms cannot reduce the level of tax avoidance 
performed by management because tax avoidance will depend on the existence of 
other corporate governance mechanisms, such as stronger external monitoring 
(Desai and Dharmapala, 2006). One of the most important sources of outside 
monitoring is the external audit of the annual report (Ng, 1978). The reasons above 
also underlie the result of testing the third hypothesis in this study, where corporate 
governance cannot moderate the negative effect of corporate social responsibility 
on tax avoidance. 
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5. CONCLUSION  
This study aims to examine the effect of corporate social responsibility on tax 
avoidance, the effect of corporate governance on tax avoidance, and the effect of 
corporate social responsibility on tax avoidance with corporate governance as a 
moderating variable. The result showed that corporate social responsibility and 
corporate governance had no effect on tax avoidance. Likewise, corporate 
governance cannot moderate the effect of corporate social responsibility on tax 
avoidance. 
The limitations of this study lie in the number of samples and years of 
observation as well as the corporate governance mechanism which is only 
measured by the Asean CG Scorecard. Future research is expected to increase 
the number of samples and the company sector to be studied and also extend the 
research time. In addition, we can add a corporate governance mechanism outside 
the Asean CG Scorecard so that it can represent the assessment of external 
parties of the company on the implementation of corporate governance. 
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